- calendar_today August 12, 2025
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In what was one of the defining features of U.S.-India relations over the past two decades, Washington and New Delhi developed one of the most robust post–Cold War partnerships with each other.
During this period, the two democracies deepened defense and strategic cooperation while also celebrating diplomatic breakthroughs that ushered in a new phase of ties built around shared strategic interests. Yet, the relationship now faces one of its biggest challenges as trust is tested and cracks appear across economic, oil, and geopolitical divides.
“I think we’re in a situation in the U.S.-India relationship where the premises and assumptions of the last 25 years — that everybody worked very hard to build, including the president in his first term — have just come completely unraveled,” Evan Feigenbaum, a South Asia analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told Foreign Policy. “The trust is gone.”
Trump’s decision to slap a 25 percent tariff on all Indian goods earlier this year, which is set to rise to 50 percent on August 27, over New Delhi’s refusal to stop buying oil from Russia in the wake of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, appears to have set relations on a new trajectory.
India’s national security adviser visited Moscow earlier this month. Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar held talks in Russia last week, which Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi followed up on in New Delhi. Modi is also preparing for a visit to China in the coming months, the first by an Indian prime minister in more than seven years. He is also set to welcome Putin to Moscow later this year. It’s not just a charm offensive.
Indian public opinion has soured as New Delhi faces continued pressure from Washington. “It’s one thing to pressure India, which they have a right to do,” Feigenbaum said. “But they’re signaling very clearly that they view that as interference in India’s foreign policy, and they are not going to put up with it.”
In this, New Delhi has been emboldened by the reality that Russia’s war in Ukraine has helped it strategically as well. Indian state-run refiners that were initially hesitant to resume purchases of Russian oil after Western sanctions on Russia resumed in March have since been won over by discounts that are estimated to be between six and seven percent.
In turn, Russian oil has increased to account for 35 percent of India’s crude imports, up from 0.2 percent before the Ukraine war, according to data provider Kpler. “Russia has upped the ante on all that,” Russian Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov was quoted as saying by Reuters. “We will continue to supply oil and oil products, thermal coal, and coking coal. We see potential for the export of Russian LNG.”
India’s strategic ‘drift’
This is not only a Russian game. Despite the India-U.S. rift, Indian and Chinese officials met “for the first time since the Xi-Modi summit” in Chennai in October last year, per a Chinese readout of the meeting. A delegation of Chinese officials and businessmen was “invited to attend the high-level political dialogue and the third meeting of the ‘Sound of Nature’ subcommittee of the intergovernmental India-China relations committee” in New Delhi, “and deepen communication and exchanges between the two sides.”
Michael Kugelman, a South Asia analyst at the Washington-based Wilson Center, said that although Trump’s move to increase tariffs on India was a major factor, this drift was in motion well before the Ukraine crisis began.
“We’ve seen indications for almost a year of India wanting to ease tensions with China and strengthen relations, mainly for economic reasons,” Kugelman said. “But the Trump administration’s policies have made India want to move even more quickly.”
In the long run, it remains to be seen what of New Delhi’s outreach is performative. “We don’t know whether, as in the past, some of these things are just theatre. But one thing we do know is that India is going to double down on some aspects of its economic and defense relationship with Russia — and those parts are not performative,” Feigenbaum said.
India had already been weaning itself from its dependence on Russian arms before the Ukraine war and instead had been importing a growing number of U.S., French, and Israeli weapons systems. But the Ukraine crisis has offered a unique opportunity for India. “India feels like it’s getting a good deal from Russia, which to many in India’s national security community validates their broader view that the U.S. can’t be trusted, whereas Russia can — because Russia is always going to be there for India no matter what,” Kugelman said.
A domestic political coup for Modi
The softening of ties with Washington and outreach to Beijing and Moscow fit into Modi’s broader domestic strategy. “Modi is using this as a domestic political coup by saying, ‘Look, I’m standing up to the U.S. and protecting Indian interests,’” Kugelman said.
Modi, whose government faces major elections next year, has emphasized his priority of protecting farmers, small businesses, and young job seekers and entrepreneurs. In this context, Kugelman said, the oil deals have a “huge domestic political importance.” In this context, he added, Modi had already signaled his desire not to take “too many steps that are unpopular at home” by making India appear to be subservient to Washington.
Kugelman said Modi had already made major concessions to Washington in areas such as lowering tariffs and repatriating Indian workers from the United States. “Because of those concessions, India needs to be careful about signaling further willingness to bend. This is one reason there was no trade deal — Modi put his foot down,” he said.
